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Academic health centers (AHCs) play a major role in
advancing medical progress in the U.S. These institutions
educate students, nurses, and allied health personnel who
are required for the country’s health system workforce. They
provide a training ground for the next generation of physi-
cians who will care for our citizens and the physician–
scientists and clinical investigators who will fuel the coun-
try’s research enterprise—currently the most productive in
the world. From the AHCs’ basic and clinical laboratories
come the discoveries that translate into new diagnostic
technologies, pharmaceuticals, and devices. New treatment
regimens are tested in multicenter clinical trials at many of
our AHCs. The economic well-being of the communities in
which AHCs reside is dependent on the financial viability of
these institutions. Biotechnology companies are spawned
from AHCs, contributing to the national economy.
From the 1970s to the early 1990s, AHCs enjoyed almost
unlimited resources, and their bottom lines always showed
profits. Health care was dominated by a fee-for-service
environment that allowed a flow of clinical income in
AHCs, yielding overages for departments and the subsidi-
zation of medical education and research. More recently,
however, there has been a reversal of these good times for
academic medicine.
For the past three years, many AHCs have experienced
severe financial stresses resulting in falling operating mar-
gins or losses that have prompted major cuts in spending
and strategies to enhance revenue streams. According to
Ralph Muller, chief executive officer of the University of
Chicago Hospitals and Health System, the average operat-
ing margin at the nation’s 125 AHCs fell to 2% at the end
of 1999, with 35% of them operating in the red (1).
According to Mr. Muller, Moody’s Investors Service down-
graded the bonds of AHCs five times more often than it
upgraded them. Margins at AHCs are expected to dip
below 1% in 2002.
THE BALANCED BUDGET ACT OF 1997:
THE CRISIS BEGINS
The major contributing factor to the financial crises at
AHCs was congressional passage of the Balanced Budget
Act (BBA, the Act) of 1997 (2). According to an in-depth
analysis of the BBA as it was originally passed, and
projections made by the Association of American Medical
Colleges (AAMC), Medicare payments emanating from the
Act, compared with estimates of how much Medicare would
have paid had the Act not been passed, would result in a
cumulative loss of $45.8 million in Medicare support for a
typical major teaching hospital by 2002. Furthermore, the
AAMC estimated that the cumulative BBA-associated
losses for the 265 major teaching hospitals analyzed would
be $14.7 billion. These Medicare reductions would lower
the median total margin for AAMC members by more than
50% (to 1%) by 2002, and 38% of the 100 major teaching
hospitals would face negative total margins (operating
losses) over the five-year enactment of the BBA. (The 1997
BBA, as originally passed, would have cut hospital payments
by $227 billion between 1998 and 2004, which is almost
twice the amount intended [1]).
OTHER FACTORS LEADING TO THE CRISIS
Other factors contributing to the financial crisis in AHCs
include:
c Ratcheting down of reimbursements from managed care
companies;
c Delays in payments of bills by health maintenance orga-
nizations (HMOs), as many of them have experienced
their own financial problems; they are not only slow to
pay but are also increasingly denying payments for services
rendered;
c A marked rise in the costs of drugs and labor; in 1998,
prescription drug expenditures increased 15% compared
with 5% for physician services and 3% for hospital care;
c Large deficits incurred by primary care physicians or
networks whose practices were purchased by AHCs;
c Acquisitions of regional community hospitals to capture
market share that subsequently proved to be unprofitable;
c Mergers of major AHCs that actually increased, rather
than reduced, total administrative costs;
c An increased number of uninsured patients;
c A disproportionate number of very sick patients who
incur high hospital costs;
c An inability to constrain expenditures;
c Ineffective and inefficient governance with excessive ad-
ministrative costs and failure to reduce overall costs;
c Establishment of university hospital–owned HMOs that
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were inappropriately managed and consequently devel-
oped large operating deficits; and
c The high cost of new technology (e.g., stents, rotobladers,
glycoprotein protein IIb/IIIa platelet antagonists) that is
under-reimbursed because of fixed case rates.
VICTIMS OF THE CRISIS
Some of our most prestigious academic institutions have
experienced major operating losses, and in some cases the
results have been graphic. For example, the University of
Pennsylvania had $198 million in operating losses in FY
1998, which increased slightly to approximately $200 mil-
lion in 1999. According to Borzo (1), the University of
California–San Francisco (UCSF) lost $50 million in the 10
months after its merger with Stanford University unraveled.
Ohio State University lost $35 million in 1999 (1). From
1997 to 1999, Wayne State University lost nearly $200
million (3). University of Connecticut Dean Peter Deckers
estimated that its 204-bed teaching hospital lost $16 million
in 1999. The University of Texas–Houston Medical Center
projected a $20 million loss this year (4).
Even the major teaching hospitals in Boston were not
immune to the effects of the BBA and the other variables
resulting in a diminishing bottom line. Jeffrey Otten,
president of Brigham and Women’s Hospital, was quoted in
The New York Times (5), stating, “Most of the hospitals are
losing money at a rate between a half-million and a million
dollars a week.” Beth Israel–Deaconess Medical Center lost
$16 million in just the first three months of 1999, even
though most of the hospital beds were filled. This loss
prompted the elimination of 80 management positions at
that hospital, thinning out the management ranks by 23.5%
(6). A subsequent report indicated that the Beth Israel–
Deaconess Medical Center planned to reduce its payroll by
$20 million, in part by laying off several hundred employees
(7). This action was prompted by a $73 million total loss in
1999. The following month, the hospital system laid off
more than 100 additional administrators and other staff in
an attempt to recover from these fiscal losses (8).
In New York, Medicare cuts were predicted to cost the
state’s hospitals $5 billion through 2002, forcing the closure
of money-losing departments and whole hospitals (5).
According to a report in the Times (9), it was projected that
New York Presbyterian Hospital would lose about $320
million, more money than any other American hospital over
the course of the BBA. The hospital’s chief executive officer
asked every department to cut spending by 5%.
MEASURES TO CURTAIL FINANCIAL LOSSES
Layoffs to reduce hospital budgets were not the only
measure taken by AHCs to counteract the staggering losses
incurred from 1997 to 1999. Cost reductions were instituted
in a number of areas. Decreasing the length of hospital stay
(LOS) was one of the first actions taken by both AHCs and
nonacademic institutions to reduce costs. This effort did
improve the financial performance of hospitals. In fact,
cutting the LOS was a particularly noteworthy achievement
in cardiovascular care, where the LOS for patients under-
going coronary artery bypass surgery fell significantly. The
LOS reduction seemed to have reached a plateau in 1999,
and now there is evidence that it is increasing slightly. At
the University of Virginia Hospital, the LOS bottomed out
at 5.2 days last year and is now 5.3 days. Thus, despite the
savings experienced by LOS reduction, it alone was not
enough to stop the downward spiral in financial perfor-
mance. Another approach to improving the bottom line was
more standardization of care, whereby savings are realized in
the purchasing of hospital supplies and commodities. Com-
panies like Novations and Premier have emerged to serve as
purchasing agents for a number of hospitals. Bulk purchas-
ing gives them the power to bargain for lower supply costs.
Similarly, overseeing drug utilization and contracting with
companies that can purchase drugs at lower prices for a
consortium of hospitals, rather than individual hospitals,
can reduce costs.
Many AHCs signed unfavorable contracts with HMOs
that, in some instances, resulted in a loss for every covered
patient treated. Evidence suggests that physicians and hos-
pitals are rejecting or deciding not to renew managed care
contracts that propose rates considerably below regional
market rates and that would result in a loss for each patient
served. Some of these contracts have required acceptance of
fees considerably below Medicare reimbursement rates for
the same services. In a recent publication, the American
College of Cardiology (ACC) noted that there are situa-
tions in which “walking away from bad business is good
business” and managed care contracts should be terminated
(10).
Academic health centers are also at an increased risk for
adverse selection in a managed care system because, as
mentioned previously, academic managed care organiza-
tions are selected by a large percentage of the sickest patients
(11). Illustrating this likelihood are Tennessee’s academic
managed care organizations, which enrolled only 4.5% of
the TennCare population in the statewide Medicaid man-
aged care program but cared for 38% of Tennessee’s AIDS
patients (11).
Academic health centers are often plagued by inefficient
administrative functions, a fact that has prompted some to
note that, in the face of such peril, teaching hospitals must
run their operations like businesses. “The survival of aca-
demic cardiology is dependent on the operation of the entity
as a business,” noted Drs. Kenneth Lee Baughman and
Michael H. Crawford in 1998, when they co-chaired the
ACC’s Thirtieth Bethesda Conference, which brought
together cardiologists and others from around the country to
examine the future of academic cardiology (12). This
observation is true now more than ever. For starters, AHCs
must reduce their cost/case ratio without sacrificing quality.
They must also establish computerized information systems
that enhance efficiency, streamline administrative functions,
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and improve oversight in clinical decision making and
medical management to reduce excess utilization of expen-
sive technology and costly drugs, which are often used
outside of practice guidelines.
In the meantime, AHCs are divesting themselves of
poorly performing primary care practices and ancillary
hospitals that are losing money. Some AHCs have even sold
their university hospitals to for-profit entities. For example,
Georgetown University, which lost $57 million in 1997, $62
million in 1998, and $83 million in 1999, sold its hospital to
improve its bottom line and save its teaching institution
(13). Facing tremendous operating losses, the University of
Minnesota sold its hospital to the private Fairview Health
Systems (13). In some instances, a sale like this one has a
happy ending. Two years after the St. Louis University
Hospital was sold to Tenet, the university faculty are
providing new services, medical school faculty continue to
be the hospital’s sole staff, and the university employs the
residents at the hospital (13).
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PROVIDES SOME RELIEF
In the years after the BBA was passed, the federal govern-
ment realized that the Act was having far worse effects on
AHCs than had been originally assumed. In 1999, as a
result of lobbying efforts by the AAMC and the American
Hospital Association, Congress passed a bill that provides
$7 billion in “give-backs” to hospitals to compensate for the
severe Medicare cuts they suffered under the BBA of 1997.
The AAMC has estimated that, for the typical teaching
hospital, the Balanced Budget Refinement Act (or “give-
back” bill) will result in a Medicare payment increase of 6%.
This year, the AAMC is fighting to freeze indirect medical
education (IME) payments at 6.5% for five years. Without
the freeze, IME payments will drop to 6.25% in FY 2001
and to 5.5% in FY 2002. These reductions in IME represent
the second largest inpatient payment cut for teaching
hospitals ever. A five-year freeze in IME payments would
cost the federal government $2.1 billion.
UNDOING FAILED MEASURES
As mentioned, some AHCs merged in hope of saving
money. In 1997, Pennsylvania State University and its
Milton S. Hershey Medical Center merged with the Geis-
inger Health System, thus creating an integrated system
with $1 billion in net operating revenues. This new system
included not only three hospitals and their affiliations but
also approximately 1,000 physicians. At the time of the
merger, the entities predicted savings of more than $20
million over three years. In 1999, they reversed their
prediction and estimated that the new integrated system
would lose between $100 and $150 million by 2002.
Approximately four months later, Penn State/Hershey and
Geisinger dissolved the merger. Stanford University and
UCSF also merged to become more efficient, increase their
market share, and save money in the process. The merger
lost $11 million in the first quarter in the second year, and
losses continued at a rate of $1 million per week. To stem
the tide, 2,000 of 12,000 staff positions were eliminated.
The merger was subsequently dissolved (14).
RESPONSE OF ACADEMIC
PHYSICIANS AND THEIR DEPARTMENTS
Faculty members in academic departments and faculty
practice plans have also been adversely affected by such
financial losses and budget cutbacks. Productivity targets for
faculty members have been increased. Dr. Judith Swain,
chair of Stanford’s Department of Medicine, reports that
relative value units per faculty member in her department
increased by 26%. Although one outcome of increased
clinical workloads is more clinical revenue, another result is
less time for teaching and clinical research. At some AHCs,
faculty salaries have increased little or not at all, and, in
some instances, salaries have been reduced. This situation
can lead to morale problems and loss of faculty members to
private practice. To reverse this trend, measures to enhance
nonclinical revenues have been instituted. Academic health
centers have enjoyed increased research funding from the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) and from industry
sponsors. Technology transfer and commercialization of
intellectual property have resulted in more revenues for
faculty members and their research laboratories. Enhanced
fundraising activities to augment endowment funds have
been successfully implemented in many AHCs. Donations
by grateful patients and foundations have supplemented the
traditional sources of clinical and grant revenues for AHCs.
Cardiology divisions and other areas in departments of
medicine have implemented clinical pathways based on
practice guidelines to reduce excessive costs, standardize
care, and improve the quality of care. Much of today’s
technology is expensive, as are many of the new pharma-
ceuticals. Appropriate use of these costly treatments is
mandatory to maintain fiscal accountability.
EMERGING FROM THE CRISIS
Although the future is looking bleak for many AHCs, there
is increasing optimism that the financial debacles of the late
1990s will be reversed. Hospital and physician groups are
engaged in intense federal lobbying efforts to further correct
the draconian cuts in Medicare imposed by the 1997 BBA.
It is expected that, when the 107th Congress convenes next
year, there will likely be major attempts to enact legislation
mandating insurance coverage for many of the 45 million
uninsured in the U.S. Among specialty societies, the ACC
is positioning itself to become one of the major advocates
for universal health coverage. Because AHCs currently
provide the largest percentage of uncompensated care,
increased revenues should be seen when a greater number of
Americans have insurance coverage. The passion of College
members for this issue has fostered the development of a
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new position statement of principles on health system
reform that will serve as the basis for its advocacy efforts.
The ACC’s Immediate Past President, Arthur Garson, Jr.,
MD, MPH, made this the subject of his Presidential
Plenary Address at the Annual Scientific Session in March
of this year (15). In its pursuit of health system reform, the
College recognizes the need to increase academic cardiolo-
gy’s research capabilities as a means to enhance the quality
of care.
In the meantime, a national effort has been launched to
double the NIH’s support of medical research. Increases of
$2 billion and $2.3 billion in the NIH budget were provided
in the past two years (16). The NIH continues to increase its
funding for basic and clinical research. This will provide
greater salary support for investigators who compete suc-
cessfully for federal grant awards.
The population of seniors in this country is growing, and
the amount of cardiovascular care needed will increase in
tandem. If AHCs, like private institutions, remain at the
cutting edge of the specialty and cardiovascular care be-
comes more cost effective, increased clinical revenue from
Medicare patients should be garnered. This would be
predicated, however, on attaining fair reimbursement from
the Health Care Financing Administration for cardiovascu-
lar care rendered to the growing Medicare population and
on implementing an effective prescription drug benefits
program. The ACC is leading a coalition of more than 40
medical and specialty groups to halt additional cuts to
physician payments through the Medicare fee schedule. In
addition, the College supports reducing the cost barriers to
outpatient prescription drugs, but without jeopardizing the
viability of the Medicare program and beneficiary access to
quality cardiovascular care.
Faculty at our AHCs must sustain their tripartite mission
of clinical care, teaching, and research, which is vital for the
optimal treatment of patients in this country. We in the
U.S. are blessed with outstanding medical care and a
research establishment that has as its goal the discovery of
new ways to prevent, diagnose, treat, and cure disease. It is
our AHCs that educate the basic researchers and train the
clinician–scientists who will be making the discoveries of
the future that will improve medical care the world over. We
must support their quest to succeed in their mission in this
twenty-first century.
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